apparently is impossible, given the political balance which was struck by this commission. Much of importance is in this report. Much more is in the supporting staff documents. A great deal in addition will be necessary if we are to solve the pressing problems of our age.

JAMES F. SHORT, JR.

Director
Social Research Center
Washington State University
Pullman


Professor Roherty has written an interesting though somewhat uneven book. It contains brief vignettes of the roles played by five former Secretaries of Defense: three “generalists”—James Forrestal, Robert Lovett, and Thomas Gates—and two “functionalists”—Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy. The “generalists” are described as “objectivist-realist,” possessed of viewpoints arising “inductively from experience,” “bare of preconceptions and illusions,” and “reserved and taciturn about men and human judgment” (p. 61). The “functionalists” are steeped in the management practices of American industry and are committed to the idea of consolidating management authority in a single executive (p. 63). There is little doubt about his preference as between these two “ideal types.” There is also more detailed analysis of the managerial style of Secretary McNamara, with particular emphasis upon the manner in which he utilized the techniques of systems analysis and the planning-programming-budgeting system to enhance his personal mastery over a department which virtually defies centralized control. Finally, there are two excellent case studies of McNamara’s decisions on the manned bomber and the nuclear carrier program.

Professor Roherty’s attempt to derive from this analysis broader conclusions about civil-military relations is somewhat less convincing. His contention that public policy is being progressively depoliticized (p. 19) is somewhat baffling. Surely the issues are more complex and the skills of specialists are at a premium. If, however, one regards political questions as those which do not yield to mere intellectual resolution, but which can be resolved only through the interplay of political power, there are certainly few issues more intensely political than those regularly dealt with by the Secretary of Defense. Nor has he made an entirely compelling case that political prudence and political process are being replaced by technical rationality and the “processes of the functionary” (p. 19). The line between politics and technical decision-making or between management and policy does not seem quite so clear-cut as Professor Roherty has drawn it.

McNamara’s managerial innovations certainly did not do away with politics in the Pentagon. They did supply him with political advantages in dealing with various clienteles and constituencies in that department. The analytic techniques on which he relied did not insure decisions that were either technically or politically beyond criticism. They did enhance the power of the analysts. The decisions he made cannot be entirely understood by focusing on the style of his administration. Nor has the author suggested that they can. But he does not emphasize so strongly as he might the larger political context in Washington. Indeed, the innovation of the McNamara managerial techniques themselves was perhaps politically feasible only during a period of rising defense budgets. Systems analysis was more readily accepted when many systems were being approved. Program budgeting was more palatable when the budget was ample. Some may regard this as bad politics; it was scarcely apolitical.

All in all, Professor Roherty’s study of the Secretary of Defense analyzes an important role and appropriately emphasizes the political qualities essential to success in that role. One can only concur in his modest conclusion “that ‘it is the men,’ not organizational blueprints or prescriptions, who are crucial in tracing the evolution of
the role of Secretary of Defense” (p. 64). If the analysis is to be carried further, I suspect more attention needs to be devoted to the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the President and other National Security advisers and to the organizational culture of the Department of Defense itself. M I C H A E L  H. A R M A C O S T
Planning and Coördination Staff
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

P A G E  S M I T H. Daughters of the Promised

If you are a man, know little about the women’s rights movement, and do not take Page Smith too seriously, Daughters of the Promised Land can provide engaging entertainment. Writing with his usual style and wit, Professor Smith has produced a broad gauged chronicle of the woman’s role in the American pageant, a role which Professor Smith believes has been buffeted by the male’s “effort to cope with feminine sexuality” by dividing “women into different functions: wife and mother on the one hand; mistress, concubine, priestess, seer, custodian of mysteries on the other” (p. 333). As a rich compendium of anecdotes about the great protagonists of the women’s rights movement, Daughters of the Promised Land is more than successful; as history, however, it is a study beset with serious problems.

Much of the trouble lies in the unidimensionality of Smith’s women. Portrayed as the product of masculine notions of feminine sexuality, they enter his narrative in only two guises: as daughters of men or as their sexual partners. Little attention is given to their roles as mothers and companions, and even when he deals with the genesis of the movement, Smith focuses not on his heroines’ organizational and institutional successes and failures, but rather on their loves and husbands and fathers. Smith’s perspective also results in a number of historical anomalies. To Smith, the American family reached its zenith in Puritan New England, which was “notably successful in containing feminine sexuality in marriage without repressing or distorting it” (p. 333). But to pursue such an argument, one must ignore other aspects of the Puritan family—its complex role patterns, which often created substantial familial strain and which resulted finally in what Edmund Morgan called Puritan tribalism, an excessive, almost pathological concern with the spiritual well-being of the children of the covenant. Or again, to argue that in the latter half of the nineteenth century, middle-class homes were disaster areas ignores significant changes in child-rearing practices which, some believe, produced a much more relaxed and natural relationship between mother and child. Or, to cite one final example, to make Mary Chesnut the epitome of southern womanhood because her diary does indeed focus on her unsatisfied sexual appetite is grossly misleading. Mrs. Chesnut was too singular, too much a product of the Charleston enclave, too taken with her own suffering, to speak for either her sex or the South.

Nonetheless, Page Smith has raised a valid point. We are sexual as well as cultural beings and our histories ought to reflect that fact. R O B E R T  Z E M S K Y
Associate Professor
American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia


Since the Eisenhower speech coining the term “military-industrial complex,” and lately with the engagement of American military in Indo-China, both the American public and the intelligentsia of this society have focused their interest on the role that the military plays in domestic and international affairs. Two recent publications concentrate their emphasis on military life.